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Abstract: 
 
After he had only tightly lost the election in July 2006, Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his 
Coalición claimed fraud and asserted that unfair conditions during the campaign had diminished his 
chances to win the presidency. The paper investigates this latter allegation centering on a perceived 
campaign of hate, unequal access to campaign resources and malicious treatment by the mass media. It 
further analyzes the mass media’s performance during the conflictual post electoral period until the 
final decision of the Federal Electoral Tribunal on September 5
th, 2006. While the media’s perform-
ance during the campaign tells us about their compliance with fair media coverage mechanisms that 
have been implemented by electoral reforms in the 1990s, the mass media is uncontained by such 
measures after the election. Thus, their mode of coverage of the postelectoral conflicts allows us to 
“test” the mass media’s transformation to a more unbiased, social responsible “fourth estate”. Finally 
the paper scrutinizes whether the claims of fraud and the protests by the leftist movement resulted in 
lower levels of institutional trust and democratic support. 
The analysis of the media performance is based on data provided by the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE). Its Media Monitor encompassed more than 150 TV stations, 240 radio stations and 200 press 
publications. However, there is no comparable data available for the postelectoral period. Interviews 
with Mexican media experts, which the author has conducted during the postelectoral period, serve as 
empirical basis for the second part. Data on the public opinions and attitudes of Mexican citizens are 
taken from the 2007 Latinobarometro, the 2006 Encuesta Nacional and several polls conducted by 
Grupo Reforma. 
The results do not support López Obradors notions. Even though a strong party bias is characteristic of 
the Mexican media system, all findings hint at a continuity of balanced campaign coverage and fair 
access to mass media publicity.  Coverage during the postelectoral period was more polarized, yet 
both sides remained at least partially open for oppositional views. The claims of fraud, mass protest 
mobilization and anti-institutional discourse by Lopez Obrador’s leftist movement seem not to have 
caused significant loss in institutional trust, support of and satisfaction with democracy, even though 
these levels remain quite low. 
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1.  Introduction
1
 
 
„There is no road to democracy, democracy is the road“ pronounced public billboards in Mex-
ico-City’s metro stations in the summer of 2006. They ironically coincided with the „Vote by 
vote, ballot box by ballot box“ choruses on the streets, which demanded a complete recount, 
and expressed distrust in the official election results and Mexico’s democratic progress. The 
general election of July 2 has distributed 628 seats in both parliamentary chambers, created 
new governments and legislatures in nine states and elected both a new Legislative Assembly 
and Mayor for the capital’s Distrito Federal. Nevertheless almost all public and international 
attention was absorbed by the presidential election, which had been forecast to be a very tight 
race. In the end the results of the first conteo rapido were too close to call and both candi-
dates, the leftist Andres Manuel López Obrador and the PAN’s Felipe Calderón, proclaimed 
themselves President-Elect, Mexico’s citizens witnessed the beginning of a conflictual post-
electoral period. These weeks saw the denunciation of electoral „fraud“ by the defeated 
Coalición por el Bien de Todos (CPBT), mass mobilization and the increasing rejection of 
democratic institutions by the Coalition’s candidate López Obrador.  
This paper is based on field research conducted in Mexico during that period, in the context of 
collecting data and conducting interviews for a larger research project, which comparatively 
explores the impacts of media concentration on the quality of democracy in Mexico and Italy. 
Here I will investigate whether partisan claims about fraudulent media performance are sup-
ported by an empirical analysis and whether the contestation of the election result has dam-
aged the consolidation of Mexico’s still young democracy. 
The Coalition’s claims of electoral fraud, which were proclaimed for the first time on the day 
after the election and evolved over the subsequent weeks, follow two different lines of argu-
mentation: The first argument revolves around inconsistencies and perceptions of the events 
in the electoral process. On July 4, López Obrador made the incendiary claim that three mil-
lion ballots were missing (even though he knew perfectly well that they were in temporary 
storage in a preliminary archive of inconsistent results as part of the initial count (the so-
called PREP)).
2 Later, the Coalition complained about „fraude cíbernetico“, an algorithm that 
supposedly had manipulated the PREP count. As layers of explanation were added, some 
Coalition members added a conspiracy theory of „traditional fraud“ – vote-buying, stuffed 
ballot boxes etc. Even though international observers noted several disturbing events from 
polling stations throughout the country, there is no proof of any significant aggregation of 
manipulations that would indicate a deliberate fraud in favour of the PAN’s Felipe Calderón 
(Trejo Delarbre 2006b und 2006d, European Union 2006, NDI 2006, IFE 2006c, Salazar 
Ugarte 2007). In rendering the judgment that ended the electoral dispute (and made Calderón 
                                                 
1 The author thanks Dr. Paul Ross for his useful remarks and his correction of the translation.  
2 On February 10, 2006 all parties and the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), which carries out the elections, had 
agreed upon this „archive of inconsistencies“ where unclear ballots were „stored“ to be counted later in the 
district count, which is the basis for the final result. Thus, they were not included in the preliminary count 
PREP, but accessible through the IFEs website.  
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President) the Federal Electoral Tribunal TRIFE noted, among other facts, the presence of the 
Coalition’s representatives in more than 96 percent of the polling stations throughout the 
country (El Universal, 05.09.06, p. A10), considered the recount results of more than 11.000 
ballot boxes and rejected the demand for nullification. The construction of a fraud, or a “fraud 
of frauds” („el fraude del fraude“) (Murayama 2006) can be understood as the core of the 
Coalition’s strategy and political rhetoric, which they employed in mass mobilizations as they 
sought official revocation of the election. 
The Coalition´s second line of argument directed claims of fraud against the media and was 
focused on campaign events. Besides the illegal campaign interference of President Vicente 
Fox and the financing of television spots by private enterprises, a sustained smear campaign 
was the Coalition´s central accusation. Assuming a relatively continuous development of me-
dia coverage over the last elections, such a manipulative media performance would be surpris-
ing. Numerous analyses have found that Mexican media coverage of elections has been in-
creasingly balanced and fair, after the presumed fraud in the 1988 election triggered reforms 
of the electoral regime in 1993, 1994 and 1997 (Lawson 2002, Moreno 2003). Today, the 
Federal Code of Election Institutions and Processes (COFIPE) provides a legal frame for the 
sale of publicity to the parties and the media coverage of the campaigns, which is embedded 
in fair media coverage mechanisms (Mena 2005).  
Despite numerous safeguards, Mexico carries the legacy of more than 70 years of rule of the 
Party of the Institutionalized Revolution PRI, whose hegemony reached out into all spheres of 
political, social and economic activity and into the lifeworlds of citizens. Through collusion 
and co-optation the PRI contained and articulated all relevant social actors and can be de-
scribed as a distributive mechanism that allocated political and administrative power on the 
local, state and federal level (Montemayor 2006: 90). Beginning in the 1970s, early electoral 
reforms made the success of opposition parties in local and regional elections possible, which 
in the long run challenged the PRI’s hegemony. In 1988 the PRI presumably could only win 
the presidential election by fraud and finally, in 2000 lost the presidency to the Party of Na-
tional Action, PAN. In the 2006 election, the crisis of the PRI becomes even more obvious: 
Although it remains in a powerful position as the only possible majority-provider in Congress 
for either PAN or López Obrador’s PRD, the party that had ruled Mexico for more than seven 
decades did not win in a single state. 
Before Mexico’s political transformation, which gained momentum during the 1990s, the me-
dia and the ruling party were closely interconnected: „In Televisa, we’re all soldiers of the 
PRI.“
3 This paradigmatically expressed the tight cooperation between the ruling party and the 
private broadcast empire, which holds a market share of over 80 percent. Together with its 
only „rival“, TV Azteca network, which had emerged in 1993 through privatization of for-
merly state-owned stations, the two major private TV networks together control more than 90 
percent of the television market. Additionally, Mexicans first and foremost obtain their politi-
                                                 
3 Infamous quotation of Televisa’s founder and owner (until his death in 1997), Emilio Azcárraga. (See 
Fernández/Paxman 2000).  
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cal information from TV sources and show relatively high trust in communication media.
4 
According to a 2005 survey, 62 percent of respondents inform themselves via television, 17 
percent via radio, and only 10 percent read newspapers (ENCUP 2005). 
Public (state-owned) media play only a marginal role in this realm. Mexico’s deficient media 
regulation does not even provide a public media law, and neglects many pressing issues, such 
as independence, clear-cut financing and adjustment to digitalization processes. The scope of 
party promotion is small and overall, public media play a marginal role (see Ortega Ramírez 
2006, La Red 2005). So „the media“ in this context refers to the private broadcast media, i.e. 
radio and television. The press, most of all the national quality press (Reforma, El Universal, 
La Jornada) is an important agenda setter and opinion leader and thus influences other types 
of media, but readership numbers are low, particularly on a daily basis.
5 These features con-
tribute to the fact that beside the „natural“ amount of media power, the Mexican private media 
dispose of both the overall potential and the historical tradition of interpretive hegemony: 
„Those who work in the politically relevant sectors of the media system (...) cannot but exert 
power, because they select and process politically relevant content and thus intervene in both 
the formation of public opinions and the distribution of influential interest“ (Habermas 2006: 
418)  
The research interest of this paper is to evaluate not only media performance, but also how 
claims of fraud and anti-institutional mass mobilization affected the Mexican democracy and 
its consolidation process. Media performance during campaigns refers to (1) the mass media’s 
mode of allocating contracted publicity space to political actors (parties and candidates), and 
(2) their mode of coverage of those actors. While the way in which parties buy time or space 
to publish their propaganda can be fixed legally in great detail, the latter is of more ambiva-
lent nature. A certain degree of partisan bias is deeply inherent in any media system, as Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) have shown. Furthermore, the way in which a paper or a radio station 
covers a candidate or a campaign is also protected by the freedom of the press and journalistic 
independence. Legal provisions should not regulate how journalists cover an issue, even un-
der a regime requiring “objective” coverage, but ought to appeal to fair coverage norms and 
monitor the media.  
The media’s performance during the post-electoral period will serve as a test of their adher-
ence to the rules of the democratic game. Whilst media performance during campaigns is le-
gally regulated (mode of allocating publicity) or contained by fair media coverage mecha-
nisms (mode of coverage), the media are unrestrained by this bridle after Election Day. Thus, 
their mode and tone of coverage of the conflict-laden political situation after the election re-
flects their more „savage“ attitudes towards fair and balanced coverage, free from legal rules 
only valid during campaigns.  
                                                 
4 On a scale from 1(no trust) to 10 (much trust) the media obtains an average value of 7,4 and is ranked four, 
behind, doctors, the army, and the church. (ENCUP 2005: 10) 
5 According to data provided by IPSOS-BIMSA (Estudio General de Medios), only 21 percent answered to have 
read the newspaper „yesterday“ (free TV: 73%), but „in the past 30 days“ this number increases to 66 percent 
(free TV: 97%). N= 26.373 interviews. 
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Given these considerations, it is possible to shed light on the connection between the media’s 
performance during the campaigns and the post-electoral conflict on the one hand and democ-
ratic consolidation on the other. Did the media eschew the legal and democratic rules and 
cause defects in the functioning of the electoral regime and the legitimation of the democratic 
system? From this, two central questions can be derived:  
(1) Can media performance exert profound influence on citizen’s voting choices, suffi-
cient to determine election outcomes and transport its party bias into broad public 
opinion? 
(2) Has the Mexican media done so, and thus disobeyed the legal rules with respect to 
democratic mechanisms? 
 
A second focus takes up the political debate and polarized rhetoric about the Coalition and 
López Obrador’s performance after the election. It is not so much the mobilization of several 
million citizens and the installation of protest blockades in Mexico-City that have aroused 
worries about his commitment to democracy. It has been López Obrador’s fierce non-
acceptance of the election results culminating in his self-proclamation as „legitimate presi-
dent“, his neglect and defamation of democratic institutions (and institutions in general) that 
refueled characterizations of López Obrador as a „tropical messiah“ (Krauze 2006) and as a 
„danger for Mexico“.
6 Therefore my analysis must include a reflection on this behavior and 
the spread of institutional distrust regarding the presumed defects of Mexican democracy and 
the progress of the democratic consolidation process. This leads to another important ques-
tion: 
(3) Did the post-electoral construction of electoral fraud and López Obrador’s neglect of 
the electoral regime cause further defects in Mexico’s democracy? 
 
 
2.  Political Intermediation and Democracy 
 
The critics of the media’s performance during the campaigns often assumed that public opin-
ion is directly generated by the „war“ of advertising spots, by the opinions expressed in the 
news media and by the more or less hidden remarks on party preferences made in entertain-
ment programs. In contrast to what the political debates about Mexico’s latest election sug-
gested, the relation between political communication and the public is manifold and deserves 
to be looked at in a more differentiated way. For this reason I will review the recent literature 
on political communication and democracy in order to answer the first question whether me-
dia performance, after all, can have a significant effect on the outcome of elections and the 
democratic system at large. First it will be necessary to distinguish different types, and sec-
ondly different effects of political communication. Third, I will focus on the demands of de-
                                                 
6 In a series of spots by the PAN at the end of the campaigns he had been denounced as „Danger for Mexico“. 
The Federal Electoral Tribunal ordered later to stop the broadcasting of these spots. (Trejo Delarbre 2006d: 
69-74).  
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mocracy – what criteria can be derived from this research for the media performance during 
elections? 
 
2.1. Varieties of Political Intermediation 
Rather than understanding the flow of political communication as a top-down vertical channel 
that makes information available to the governed citizens – who are perceived as passive 
viewers who can be easily manipulated – recent research has reinvigorated the perception of 
potentially active, selective citizens who receive and multiply information about politics to 
other citizens in a variety of ways. To limit the broad spectrum of communication, which can 
also be nonverbal or virtual, we instead use the term intermediation, referring to “the varying 
channels and processes through which voters receive information about partisan politics dur-
ing the course of election campaigns and are mobilized to support one party or another.” 
(Gunther/Montero/Puhle 2007: 1). Thus, political information flows primarily through three 
main channels: interpersonal intermediation through (1) social networks such as families, 
neighbors, friends or colleagues and (2) organizations or secondary associations in which citi-
zens are members and communicate or deliberate over political issues, and (3) impersonal 
intermediation via the mass media. 
The results of the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) have shown (Gun-
ther/Montero/Puhle 2007) that even though partisan ties may be low and the membership in 
political organizations decreasing, impersonal intermediation through the media has long been 
overestimated: “Interactive and repeated communication with credible and consistently politi-
cized sources of information — such as that which tends to take place with interpersonal dis-
cussants — is potentially more influential as a source of both persuasive messages and trust-
worthy and usable political cues. In contrast, impersonal communication, lack of perceivable 
shared interests, and ambiguous or multiple and contradictory messages understandably di-
minish the potential for influence.“ (Magalhães 2007: 242) Thus, an analysis of media per-
formance in the campaigns before Mexico’s elections of 2006 and during the post-electoral 
conflicts can only result in knowledge about one channel of political information, and even a 
highly manipulative party -bias would not automatically determine favorable public opinion 
towards one party, but merely be introduced to interpersonal discussion networks. The prob-
lem with basing analysis on media performance during and after the Mexican campaign is that 
it only focuses on impersonal intermediation. 
The second perception that has recently been corrected is that of the passive media consumer, 
who becomes less interested in politics and more cynical about political issues the more he or 
she consumes media (principally TV) that scandalize, communicate negativity and reduce 
reality to short sound bites (e.g. Sartori 1997, 2003). The observation that citizens who re-
ceive most of their information from television sources show less political trust than citizens 
who obtain their information from a wider scope of sources became known as video malaise 
hypothesis in the 1970s. Instead of returning to Paul Lazarsfeld’s minimal effects, recent stud-
ies challenge the hypothesis of demobilization and instead show a „virtuous circle“ effect of 
mass mediated information, at least in Western democracies (Norris 2000, Schmitt- 
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Beck/Voltmer 2007, Demers 2002). According to these studies, exposure to mediated infor-
mation leads to higher levels of political knowledge resulting in more political participation: 
„The public is not passively absorbing whatever journalists and politicians tell them, not sim-
ply taking everything at face value. Rather, because of increased cognitive skills and greater 
diversification of media outlets, the public is actively sifting, sorting, and thereby constructing 
impressions in line with their prior predispositions.“ (Norris 2000: 317f) Thus, people tend to 
interpret the information they receive rather than just passively adopt mediated interpreta-
tions.  
These results and the brighter picture of media influence they offer cannot yet be interpreted 
to say that the media do not matter. As Schmitt-Beck/Voltmer (2007) have shown, even in 
newly established democracies the media function as „seedsmen“ rather than „gravediggers“ 
of democracy. The authors note that unlike in most established democracies the weak and 
marginalized public media sector cannot (yet) counterbalance the trivialized and low-quality 
information often noted in commercial broadcast media, while they found high-quality infor-
mation to be the „most valuable for the consolidation of political culture in new democracies“ 
(ibid: 124) Magalhães (2007: 244) emphasizes that impersonal, mediated information has a 
higher impact, where „media landscapes are dominated by strongly partisan outlets.“ As noted 
above, the Mexican media landscape is marked by dominant outlets, strong and deeply rooted 
traditions of party parallelism
7 and intensive viewer identification.  
In sum, it seems that media can influence electoral outcome – but it cannot do so in a direct 
and manipulative way. Sixty percent of Mexicans may obtain most of their political informa-
tion from television, but they will cognitively process that information, discuss it within their 
social networks or organizations and reflect on it against the background of their value pat-
terns. Additionally, different media sources tend to be selected according to the primal value 
configuration and partisan preferences of citizens. Thus Lópezobradoristas will tend to prefer 
the strongly leftist La Jornada instead of the centrist Reforma for their daily newspaper diet. 
According to the “home team hypothesis” (Holmberg 1999) citizens could perceive a stronger 
bias that is critical of „their“ candidate than vice versa.  
At the same time, the media’s interpretive power is constrained by laws and fair media cover-
age mechanisms that, in the Mexican case, have been introduced by the electoral reform of 
1994. These mechanisms work with pleas for fair and balanced coverage on the one hand and 
the publication of monitored results about compliance on the other. Bearing in mind that there 
is no single-lane influence between mediated information and citizens’ opinions, it is never-
theless crucial that these rules be respected and that the media comply with their normatively 
defined and institutionalized role during the campaigns. With Mexico’s long traditions of me-
dia-party collusion and a history of neglecting and ignoring opposition parties in the media, 
compliance with the law and fair media mechanisms is a prerequisite for equal and competi-
tive campaigns. 
                                                 
7 „Political Parallelism” (Hallin/Mancini 2004: 27-28) refers to the associational ties between the media and the 
parties (or broader political tendencies). Among the various components of this concept are (biased) media 
content, organizational connections between the media and political parties (and other political organiza-
tions), political affiliations and career paths of media workers, and journalistic role orientations and practices.  
  13 
 
 
 
2.2. The Rules of the Game 
Before turning to the empirical data of Mexico’s media performance during the 2006 cam-
paigns and the post-electoral period (which lasted from Election Day to the final decision of 
the Federal Electoral Tribunal TRIFE on September 5, 2006) it is necessary to review the re-
quirements and criteria offered by democratization theory on the functioning of democratic 
electoral regimes. The criteria defined by Wolfgang Merkel et al. (2003) for what they call 
embedded democracy
8 serves as a basis for evaluating the electoral regime and its institutions, 
especially the violations that are held responsible for the development of defective democra-
cies. The indicators employed by Merkel et al., such as the existence of universal, active and 
passive suffrage, free and fair elections and rule of elected representatives (Merkel et al. 2003: 
80, Merkel 2004: 38) encompass an accepted catalogue which is reflected, for instance, in the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) criteria for evaluating an electoral regime. (BTI 
Codebook: 11)
9  
In the context of this paper it is most of all the criteria offered for the indicator of free and fair 
elections that are interesting, because the active/passive suffrage and the mode of allocating 
political incumbents are uncontested in the Mexican case. According to Merkel at al. (2003: 
80) there are two main sub-indicators that refer to free and fair elections: (1) an open, com-
petitive electoral process including equal registration approval of parties and candidates, and 
equal opportunities (equal access to resources such as media) and (2) a proper electoral opera-
tion including the absence of interruptions and malfunctions (as significant aggregation of 
manipulations) and neutrality of the electoral administration. As mentioned above, irregulari-
ties that may have occurred in the process of the Election Day and the counting of the votes 
shall not be discussed in this paper. Instead, I will focus on whether there have been fair pre-
conditions during the campaign and if the outcome of the election was adequately open.  
The importance of competitive elections is also underlined by Diamond/Morlino’s (2005) 
assessment of democratic quality: “(D)emocracies vary in their degree of competitiveness – in 
the openness to the electoral arena by new political forces, in the ease in which incumbents 
can be defeated, and in the equality of access to the mass media and campaign funding on the 
part of competing political parties.” (ibid: XVII) The introduction of competitiveness to for-
merly rigged elections through several electoral reforms has been the central accomplishment 
of Mexico’s democratic transition. Adam Przeworski’s famous observation, that democracy is 
a system in which parties lose elections, has become reality for Mexicans over more than a 
decade. Beginning in the late 1980s, the main opposition parties PAN and PRD (since 1990) 
won some municipal and state elections, and later obtained seats in Congress. It would not be 
until 2000, after 61 years in the opposition, that the PAN ended the PRI’s presidential monop-
                                                 
8 „An embedded, liberal democracy consists of five partial regimes: a democratic electoral regime, political 
rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that effective power to govern 
lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives. (...) The concept of embedded democracy follows 
the idea that stable constitutional democracies are embedded in two ways. Internally the specific interde-
pendence/independence of the different partial regimes (...) secures its normative and functional existence. 
Externally, these partial regimes are embedded in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it 
from outer as well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies.“ (Merkel 2004: 36) 
9 See http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de.  
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oly. Several electoral reforms had taken place in the 1970s to invigorate the regime’s slipping 
legitimacy. But after the presumed fraud of 1988, a new electoral regulation had become vi-
tally important for the PRI “dinosaur” regime. Reforms in 1993, 1994 and 1997 founded an 
independent electoral institution (the IFE) under civil societal inclusion and made a number of 
legal adjustments to allow for the opposition’s electoral success. Being so important in the 
democratization process, it comes as no surprise that the reproaches of López Obrador aim 
precisely at the tender spot of not having had the same opportunities as Felipe Calderón – 
especially when it comes to media access and treatment by the media. 
Thus, the analysis of the media performance during the election has to focus on the following 
successive aspects: 
•  Have all candidates or parties had equal access to financial resources and equal access 
to publicity in the mass media? 
•  Have candidates or parties been treated significantly negative or received significantly 
lower attention in the mass media’s coverage than their competitors?
10 
•  Did the media’s performance comply with legal rules and the norms of fair media 
coverage? 
Should any of these questions be answered with “No”, this would hint at a regression of the 
level of competitiveness that has been reached so far – each “no” adding up to a severe defect 
of the indicator “free and fair elections” and, thus to deficits of the electoral regime. 
 
 
3.  Allocating Contracted Publicity 
 
The following section will analyze the mass media’s performance regarding the mode and 
process of allocating contracted publicity, i.e. the access of parties and candidates to mediated 
publicity, as spots and other promotion relevant to the campaign. The Mexican campaigns are 
among the longest and most expensive in Latin America. Presidential elections are held on the 
first Sunday in July, and the election period starts officially in October of the previous year. In 
2006 the campaigns began on January 19
th and lasted for five and a half months. Adding the 
pre- and pre-pre- campaigns, the race actually got under way seventeen months before the 
inauguration of the new President took place. (Woldenberg 2006: 60)  
The three relevant actors in the realm of electoral mediated publicity are  
(1) political parties, which alone enjoy the privilege to buy airtime according to the strict 
rules of the COFIPE’s article 48 - candidates depend upon their parties or coalitions to 
assign them a certain amount of that airtime,
 11 
                                                 
10 A large party such as the PAN will of course obtain much more media attention than a small party, e.g. Nueva 
Alianza – but in size and scope of representation they are not considered direct „competitors“. The main 
competitors in the 2006 election were PAN, PRD, and to a lesser degree the PRI. 
11 Which reads (§1): „Es derecho exclusivo de los partidos políticos contratar tiempo en radio o televisión para 
difundir mensajes orientados a la obtención del voto durante las campañas electorales (...). (§13) En ningún 
caso, se permitirá la contratación de propaganda en radio y television en favor o en contra de algún partido 
político o candidato por parte de terceros.“ However, the COFIPE does not rule out the mode of buying space  
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(2) the mass media, bound by transparency laws and agreements with the  
(3) Federal Electoral Institute IFE, which organizes and monitors both the parties’ and the 
media’s activities, allocates financial resources, and to whom the parties are account-
able and have to report their publicity investments. 
In the process of the campaign the parties then contract airtime (or space in the press, which 
plays only a marginal role and is not even ruled out in the COFIPE) directly from the broad-
cast outlets. Then they report to the IFE, which has been provided with a price list by the me-
dia outlets before the campaigns started, how much time they have contracted and how much 
they have spent. As a general rule the prices for campaign airtime must not be higher than 
airtime for commercial advertisement. The spending and the sources of the money have been 
liable to accountability measures since the electoral reform of 1993. Additionally, the domi-
nant Televisa network and the IFE agreed in October 2005 that Televisa would communicate 
detailed information on the contracting of airtime to the IFE.
12 These formal and informal 
measures of transparency are meant to hinder the favoritism towards one party or another (a 
long tradition under the PRI’s rule). Also, the access to public funding has been balanced and 
transparent since the 1996 reform. The statement of accounts of the 1994 election revealed 
how important these reforms have been: in that electoral campaign the PRI had spent four 
times the amount for publicity that all other parties combined had invested. 
Besides a small amount of public airtime in state-owned as well as private media, which the 
parties can use for their propaganda, it is only private media that are allowed to sell airtime. 
Thus, state-owned media play a very marginal role in campaign spots because of both their 
small market share and their non-availability as vehicles for publicity. Another consequence is 
that large parts of the public funding which parties receive for their campaigns flow into pri-
vate broadcast outlets, the vast majority of it to Televisa.
13 This is a huge difference compared 
to other countries, such as Italy, where the media system is similarly characterized by an in-
tense media concentration. The Italian par condicio law prohibits any paid publicity in elec-
toral campaigns. Instead, the media outlets have to distribute free airtime or space adequately 
to all political parties.  
As elections have become increasingly competitive in the course of the 1990s, the share of the 
funding that parties spent for media publicity has risen tremendously. From about 25 percent 
of their total expenditures in 1994, the amount rose to about 55 percent in 1997 and 2000 and 
reached more than 70 percent (just for TV!) in the 2006 campaign (Woldenberg 2006: 57, 
Villamil 2006b). The marginal role of the press is reflected in the IFE’s data on campaign 
spending of the three major parties or coalitions in table 1.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
in the press. This, too, hints at the extraordinary importance of TV and radio in the media as a whole and es-
pecially during campaigns in Mexico. 
12 View the contract at http://www.etcetera.com.mx/pagife-televisa1ne60.asp <Rev. 10.01.2007>. 
13 Villamil 2006b, Televisa earned a historic 21% increase in its income (9.8 billion Mexican Pesos) in the sec-
ond trimester of 2006. Milenio, July 18
th, 2006 (URL: 
http://www.milenio.com/mexico/milenio/notaanterior.asp?id=637707, Rev. 15.05.2007).  
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Table 1: Campaign Expenditures in Press, Radio and TV, January 19 – June 28, 2006 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Press Radio TV
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
P
e
s
o
s
PAN CPBT AxM  
PAN = Partido Accion Nacional, CPBT = Coalición Por el Bien de Todos (PRD, PT, Convergencia), 
AxM = Alianza Por México (PRI, PVEM) 
1 US-Dollar = 10,8 Mexican Pesos (20.12.2006) 
Source: IFE, author’s calculation 
 
At the same time we see that the parties had been provided with comparable, balanced 
amounts of money: the two coalitions spent similar amounts on party propaganda in TV, radio 
and press – about 360 million Pesos (CPBT) and 368 million Pesos (AxM). The PAN, which 
ran without smaller partners, spent about 220 million Pesos (in the same media). The parties 
thus had roughly equal resources, allocated as indicated by the legal institutions and spent 
them according to their individual media strategies.
14 Unlike the PAN’s and the Coalition’s 
preferences, the PRI’s Alianza relied significantly more on press products and less on radio 
announcements.  
In a second step the analysis will focus on the appearance of the spots, and the real configura-
tion of the airtime the parties bought. It is important to check whether they really enjoyed 
equivalent conditions or, as has often been the case, one party or another spent more money, 
but gained much less airtime than others. Most of all, the focus is on the PAN and the Coali-
tion. The data available via the IFE Media Monitor allow a comparison of airtime and the 
number of spots which the parties contracted for the presidential race as well as for the elec-
tion to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and for general party propaganda. Since the re-
sults (and the equal opportunities) of the parliamentary elections are not contested, we will 
                                                 
14 In October 2007, after the completion of the manuscript, the IFE published an investigation according to 
which about 281.000 spots both in radio and on TV have not been correctly declared in the parties’ settle-
ments of account to the IFE. In a five-month investigation, the Comisión de Fiscalización found (among 
other things) fake invoices and false declarations. All competing parties resp. alliances/coalitions seem to 
have employed such practices and are to be fined accordingly. If the TRIFE asserts these findings, the parties 
could face fines in the range of 500 million Mexican Pesos (46 million US$). See 
www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/154949.html (10.10.07) or www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/29761.html 
(17.10.07).  
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focus only on propaganda aired to obtain support for the presidential candidates Felipe Cal-
derón (PAN), Andrés Manuel López Obrador (CPBT) and Roberto Madrazo (AxM). The two 
remaining presidential candidates, Roberto Campo (Nueva Alianza) and Patricia Mercado 
(Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina) both obtained less than five percent and broadcast 
significantly fewer spots, so that they play in an entirely different league and will be left out 
of the focus, notwithstanding their relative success in the elections.  
It is also important to note that the nature of “airtime” varies widely. There is a huge differ-
ence between airtime being broadcast nationwide or locally, between primetime and spots 
shown at times with lower audience shares. Without digging deep into the media strategies of 
the competing parties, the data do reveal different preferences, but not a distribution of airtime 
that would hint at a discrimination of either one party or coalition. 
Even though the PAN obviously decided to air more radio ads than the other parties, the 
amount of airtime seconds during prime time is relatively balanced both in radio and TV. Fur-
thermore, we see that the time of TV propaganda is about equal. The IFE data (not reflected in 
Table 2) reveal that Felipe Calderon’s share of primetime national TV is some  25.000 sec-
onds larger than López Obrador’s, yet on local TV López Obrador tops Felipe Calderón by 
more than 60.000 seconds.
15  
 
Table 2: Airtime in Radio and TV (Total and Primetime) 
0
200
400
600
800
1.000
1.200
1.400
1.600
1.800
2.000
Total Primetime Total Primetime
Radio TV
t
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
 
* TV here is nationwide TV 
Primetime: TV: 7pm-midnight, Radio: 6 am-10am 
Source: IFE 
 
In sum, López Obrador’s claim of inequality seems out of step with a media regime in which 
all parties dispose of equivalent resources, can contract their publicity freely, and in which he 
received combined radio and TV airtime roughly equal to Roberto Madrazo – and more than 
                                                 
15 Visit the IFEs accumulated data on spots of the presidential candidates at: 
http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/Internet/Partidos_Politicos_DEPPP/mediospp_DEPPP/Monitoreo_campanas/est
aticos_monitoreo/1-28junio06/gTelevisionAcumuladoJunioPresidente.pdf <Rev. 10.01.2007>.  
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Felipe Calderón. Another example further illustrates that López Obrador’s relation to the 
broadcast media has by no means been one of discrimination, least of all in reference to the 
media’s allocation of airtime. Similarly to President Vicente Fox, who has been hosting a 
weekly radio show for several years, López Obrador broadcast a personal daily TV show 
called “The Other Version” throughout the electoral campaign. The show was on air from 6 to 
6.30 am, reminiscent of the morning press conferences he held during his tenure as mayor of 
Mexico City, and were repeated at night. The contract his Coalition signed with TV Azteca, 
which broadcast the show nationwide, tells a story of unfair media performance that is strik-
ingly at odds with his claims. Charging merely 156.000 Pesos per show, the price was 40 
times cheaper than the fixed standard price per minute for electoral campaigns (Trejo Delar-
bre 2006e). If anything, this statistic reflects clear favoritism on behalf of López Obrador that, 
if not outright illegal, settles in the grey zone between party bias and media freedom. 
 
Even though the access to campaign resources and media access for political propaganda has 
been equivalent and transparent, López Obrador’s complaints also address issues of content: a 
presumed “campaign of hate”, or a “guerra sucia” against him. For the purposes of my argu-
ment, this issue will play only a minor role, since the content of the spots is determined by the 
political parties and does not provide information of the media’s performance, which serve as 
transmitters only. However, it can’t be left aside when it comes to the campaign coverage and 
will be reviewed in more detail later on. 
Since the election result had been forecast to be a close race, the campaigns have been highly 
competitive. This resulted in a number of spots with defamatory statements, such as those by 
the PAN proclaiming López Obrador to be a “danger for Mexico”. After various complaints, 
the IFE as well as TRIFE debated the complex issue of freedom of expression vs. abusive 
behavior, and finally the TRIFE called for a halt on the broadcast of these spots. The legal 
regulation of propaganda content is indeed relatively strict. Article 38 of the COFIPE states 
clearly that parties must abstain from any expression of insults, defamation or libel against 
citizens, institutions or other parties.
16 Of course, the border between defamation and freedom 
of expression is difficult to draw. “Despite repeated urges and resolutions from the Federal 
Electoral Institute as well as from the Federal Electoral Tribunal the principal parties have 
insisted on disseminating spots of a negative tone”, writes Raul Trejo (2006d: 74). Coming 
from both the Coalition’s and the PAN’s side, the TRIFE later ruled in its final judgment that 
the illegal negativity of the party propaganda has had no decisive influence on the electoral 
outcome. The interesting question that remains (but cannot be answered here) is whether 
Mexico’s culture of campaigning, i.e. its political rhetoric and campaign behavior, is changing 
as the electoral spectrum is becoming increasingly competitive.  
A more serious interference with the legal rules of the electoral process were spots broadcast 
by commercial enterprises such as Sabritas, Pepsico or Jumex, not explicitly in favor of the 
                                                 
16 COFIPE, Art. 38 reads: „(Son obligaciones de los partidos políticos nacionales) (a)bstenerse de cualquier 
expresión que implique diatriba, calumnia, infamia, injuria, difamación o que denigre a los ciudadanos, a las 
instituciones públicas o a otros partidos políticos y sus candidatos, particularmente durante las campanas 
electorales y en la propaganda política que se utilice durante las mismas;“.  
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PAN, but highlighting the importance of political continuity. President Vicente Fox also be-
haved in an illegal way by publicly taking sides. Even though the TRIFE acknowledged all 
these irregularities against which the Coalition had filed charges, it did not regard their influ-
ence as decisive for the electoral outcome in its final judgement and thus not sufficient for 
voiding the election. 
In sum, the legal regulations of allocating contracted publicity all applied, parties had enjoyed 
equal access to the media and made use of it. The media outlets are, in turn, not responsible 
for the content of the aired propaganda, so that the claim of a campaign of hate may apply to 
the behavior of the parties, but not to the media’s performance regarding the realm of party 
advertisement. Also, the IFE and TRIFE fulfilled their function as supervisory institutions. 
 
4.  Covering the Campaign 
 
With respect to elections, the media have a dual function: not only as the transmitter of paid 
partisan propaganda, but also as the transmitter of coverage that frequently conveys political 
opinions. The former should be regulated in detail (and is in Mexico). The latter should not be 
as strongly regulated, since it is protected from state interference by the freedom of the press. 
According to press freedom rules, the media may freely express critical opinions of one party 
or candidate, or another. This is their basic right, indispensable in any democratic system. 
However, in a society such as Mexico, where people rely excessively on the media for politi-
cal information, and where competitive elections have only recently replaced a one-party he-
gemony, there is a need for mechanisms fostering balanced media coverage. 
The presumed electoral fraud of 1988 demolished the legitimacy of the old electoral regime, 
and triggered a series of electoral reforms in the 1990s. In the course of these reforms inde-
pendent and transparent institutions as the IFE and TRIFE were installed, party financing and 
the electoral process was restructured to form a more inclusive, participatory and transparent 
electoral regime. One of the central demands in the negotiations of the 1994 electoral reform 
was a more balanced and fair media presence and media coverage. As a result, a well-
functioning system of fair media coverage has been created. “Fair media coverage for politi-
cal parties is a guarantee offered by the state to ensure equitable coverage in, and impartial 
treatment from, the media during election campaigns” according to David Mena (2005: 30) 
this mechanism. Media outlets, TV and radio stations, editorial staffs and journalists are 
called on to reflect and report about the campaigns in as responsible, balanced and prejudice-
free a manner as possible. As we can see in table 3, the shares of media coverage, that the 
participating parties obtained, have almost converged to equilibrium in the following elections 
starting in 1994.  
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Table 3: Shares of Media Coverage 1988 – 2006 in Percent 
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* In 1988 several opposition groups formed the Frente Democrático, which shortly thereafter transformed into 
the PRD. 
** In 1994 nine candidates ran for presidency, which is why the small parties have such a high share of media 
coverage. 
The numbers refer to the campaign coverage of Mexico’s two major news programs. 
Source: Trejo Delarbre 2006c: 23, and more detailed in Trejo Delarbre 2001 
 
The data show nothing less but a clear break with the hegemonic party bias that Mexicans 
formerly knew. The reason why the normative appeals worked is that the IFE Media Monitor 
controls their implementation. This Monitor keeps all relevant media and their compliance 
with fair media norms under surveillance and regularly publishes its results. In the course of 
the 2006 campaigns, the IFE monitored the impartiality of media coverage in more than 150 
TV Stations, 240 radio stations and 200 press publications (nationwide and local). For al-
though there are no legal sanctions for non-compliance, still the fair media coverage system 
manages to contain partisan bias and provides a strong argument for the efficiency of informal 
regulation by commercial interests and a strong desire from the Mexican public to be in-
formed in a balanced way. The possible loss of its audience for certain programs which the 
IFE monitor reveals to be imbalanced in their coverage, seems to be enough of a threat to 
Mexico’s highly commercialized media. Another reason could be rooted in the home team 
hypothesis, i.e. that the audience’s selective exposure corresponds to their individual political 
attitudes. Thus, it could be possible that media outlets cover campaigns in a more balanced 
way when monitored, because they do not want to lose viewers/listeners/readers by being too 
critical of the audience’s favorite party/candidate or too positive toward opponents. 
The development towards more balanced coverage of campaigns has continued in 2006. In-
deed, the IFE Media Monitor reveals a more equal coverage of the presidential candidates in 
state-controlled media such as Canal 11 (which is associated with the National Polytechnic 
Institute) than in commercial broadcast media. But even there the quantitative share of the 
parties/candidates is rather balanced, as Table 3 shows (referring to the two main news pro-
grams, on Televisa and TV Azteca (after its creation in 1993). Adding up all monitored news 
programs, the IFE data sustain that balanced shares of references have been the general rule  
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during the 2006 campaigns. Instead of having been neglected by the media, López Obrador’s 
campaign has received the most attention. 
As we can see in table 4, a quantitative perspective does not support the Coalition’s claims of 
discrimination by the media. However, impartiality means more than just equal time. Impor-
tant are as well the main focus of campaign reporting and the tone and presentation in form of 
positive or negative evaluations.  
 
Table 4: Total Amount of References (menciones) in all (347) news Programs evaluated by 
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PAN= Partido Acción Nacional, AxM= Alianza Por México (PRI, PVEM), CPBT= Coalición Por el Bien 
de Todos (PRD, PT, Convergencia), AsyC= Partido Alianza Socialdemocrata y Campesina, NA= Partido 
Nueva Alianza 
* Varios = two or more actors or issues 
** PEF = Proceso Electoral Federal, i.e. the electoral process itself 
Source: IFE 2006b: 1 
 
The degree of objectivity, party bias or outright political parallelism in media coverage is 
deeply rooted in media systems. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini argue that „the strength of 
advocacy traditions in journalism is connected with the history of institutional ties between 
the media and the system of parties and organized social groups“ (Hallin/Mancini 2004: 29) 
and define three ideal types of media systems according to their geographic occurrence. De-
spite some important differences (like the role of state media), the Mexican media system 
corresponds most to the Polarized Pluralist Model (endemic primarily in the Mediterranean 
countries of Europe), especially in regard to its long tradition of commenting bias. Impartial-
ity, in the sense of an ethos of “objectivity” – the normative basis of Anglo-Saxon journalism 
– has traditionally had a low impact in the Mexican media. Mexican journalism is marked by 
the typical political parallelism of the Polarized Pluralist Model, namely the association of 
certain media with a certain party or parties. “We are on the PRI’s side, we’ve always been on 
the PRI side, we do not believe in any other formula. And as members of our party we will do  
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everything possible for the victory of our candidate” said Emilio Azcárraga about the relation 
between his Televisa network and the presidential campaigns in 1988.
17 And indeed, there are 
many ways of introducing party bias to information. It is not only the mere information item 
that reaches viewers/listeners, but also the images used and the tone of the presentation. For 
example, an apparently “objective” piece of news about a candidate and his plans for social 
reform could be embedded in a presentation showing him or her visiting an orphanage or in a 
pictorial presentation using archive films of a previous corruption scandal. Thus, a mere quan-
titative surplus of references does not imply balanced campaign coverage of media contents.  
 
Thus, the IFE Media Monitor first separates references (menciones) in the news media into 
valued and non-valued references. Those that are counted as non-valued are not necessarily 
solid facts, but may have been expressed in discussion rounds, interviews, polls or satirical 
programs. Thus, they may contain valuations (valoraciones), but no valuations by the corre-
sponding media outlet. In the 2006 campaigns, eight percent of all party references in Mex-
ico’s news programs referred to this group of non-valued information. The remaining 92 per-
cent of news references have been subject of positive, negative or neutral valuation as defined 
by the IFE. Positive valuation, of course, refers to expressions that promote one candidate or 
party. Neutral and negative valuations differ in as that the former is rooted in facts, whilst the 
latter is not, but rather expresses personal opinions of the presenter. The monitor accounts not 
only for verbal expressions, but also for body language, gestures, tone of voice and subtitles.  
In 2006, the IFE Monitor counted 96 percent of valued references as neutral valuations, one 
percent positive and 3 percent negative. This implies a relatively moderate degree of partisan 
bias. At least it does not suggest an excessive negativism in the media coverage. These value-
containing references have been counted in radio and TV news, including different genres of 
information as informative news, report, analysis or editorial, and do not refer to any other 
form of broadcast information or bias in other programs, such as entertainment programs. 
Table 5 shows the course of positive and negative references in relation to the total amount of 
references (including neutral references) over the entire campaign. 
As it turns out, the Coalition’s campaign has been covered in a clearly more negative way 
than the other parties. From January to April the negative bias rose constantly and reached a 
level more than twice as high as the PAN, the direct competitor of López Obrador’s Coalition. 
Beginning in April, the negativism decreased and reached its lowest level of the entire cam-
paign coverage in June. However, the Coalition received the largest amount of positive refer-
ences, too. In March, almost twice as many positive references on the Coalition’s campaign 
were broadcast than on the PAN’s campaign. In sum, the data on campaign coverage do not 
support the claim of extraordinary media favoritism towards the PAN’s and Felipe Calderón’s 
campaign.  
It is notable, too, that the closer Election Day approached, the less negative coverage was 
broadcast about all three of the parties, and the more equal the number of positive references 
became. Beginning in March, the shares of positive references of the three largest par-
                                                 
17 Fernández/Paxman 2000: 320.  
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ties/coalitions start to converge. The negative references of all parties reached their lowest 
level in June – except maybe for the PAN, whose amount only reached the level of January, 
but had still clearly decreased. This development underlines the diagnosis stated above, that 
media performance regarding campaign coverage was not at all aimed at manipulating public 
opinion towards support for the PAN and its candidate Calderón. Rather, the media complied 
well with the norms of fair media coverage and showed additional moderation during the 
more decisive second half of the campaigns. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Positive and Negative Valuations in Radio and TV News Programs 
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PAN= Partido Acción Nacional, AxM= Alianza Por México (PRI, PVEM), CPBT= Coalición Por el Bien de 
Todos (PRD, PT, Convergencia) 
Source: IFE Media Monitor based on 120 TV and 195 Radio news programs; author’s calculations 
Visit the IFE Media Monitors Database at http://monitoreo-noticiarios.ife.org.mx/IFElinea/hmain_menu.aspx 
(Noticiarios/Radio and TV/Resultado en todas las Entidades Monitoreadas) <Rev. 02.01.2007> 
 
However, the rules of fair media coverage mechanisms and thus the IFE Media Monitor only 
apply to programs dedicated to political information. They do not demand, rule out or control 
opinions expressed in other types of programs, such as entertainment programs. In fact, these 
spaces were used in the 2006 campaigns for party propaganda, which aroused fervent debates. 
The most prominent example of these incidents is that of Mexico’s very popular telenovela La  
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Fea Mas Bella. In its episode of June 28, the final day of the campaigns, two of the main 
characters converse in favor of Felipe Calderón. Even though commercial product placement 
is very common in this type of Mexican TV programs, there have been many protests and 
complaints about these incidents, which were scattered occurrences rather than a general rule. 
In fact, they seem to have contributed to a decrease in Televisa’s ratings and an increase in 
public media skepticism, most of all relating to Televisa. The image of the all-dominating 
media giant had suffered before, in spring 2006, when a media reform was passed which sus-
tained and increased the private media’s power and carries the inofficial name “Ley Televisa” 
(Televisa Law). Televisa had exerted considerable pressure on politicians to support the law, 
which overshadowed the campaign and gained a larger share of public attention than media 
reforms usually do. 
Nevertheless we can conclude that the media have generally complied with the legal rules 
regarding the allocation of contracted publicity as well as with the norms of fair media cover-
age providing information on the campaigns, the competing parties and candidates. The de-
gree of partisan bias in the media have been relatively low and was distributed among all par-
ticipating parties or candidates. The remaining biased references are not likely to be damaging 
to democratic processes or to the election, they are rather backed up by the liberty of freedom 
of the press and they are, too, rooted in and typical for the Mexican media system. 
 
5.  Covering the Post-electoral Conflict 
 
The post-electoral period lasted from the evening of the Election Day, July 2 until the final 
verdict of the Federal Electoral Tribunal TRIFE on September 5, 2006. Since the election’s 
result had been too close to call on the Election Day, it took eight weeks until Mexican citi-
zens knew the name of their future president, Felipe Calderón. Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
and his Coalition put in doubt the slight advantage of the PAN’s candidate, proclaimed elec-
toral fraud and mobilized several million Mexicans to protest in the heart of Mexico City and 
elsewhere. The media’s performance, i.e. the mode of coverage of this conflict-laden situa-
tion, is of special interest because it was no longer restricted by legal rules or norms of fair 
media coverage. Given that no formal or informal rules restricted their reporting and that no 
monitoring of their coverage took place in the post-electoral period, the questions arise: Did 
the mode of coverage change, and how? Did the polarization of political conflict translate into 
polarized media coverage? 
It is necessary to address several methodological problems at this point. First and foremost we 
do not have any data comparable to the IFE Media Monitor, which collected monitoring data 
during the campaigns only. In fact, there are no available data quantifying airtime, the number 
of references or valuations of coverage for the post-electoral period. Due to these circum-
stances it is important to point out that the following observations about the media’s perform-
ance during the post-electoral period are much less easily quantifiable than the foregoing 
analysis of their performance during the campaigns. However, it deserves attention and 
should not be neglected in the context of this paper, not least because of the presumed contri- 
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bution of the media to the “construction of fraud”. The observations about media performance 
during the time between the election and the TRIFE’s final decision are based on both the 
review of the daily press and opinion-leading journals as well as on interviews with Mexican 
experts, conducted by the author during the post-electoral period.
18 
Allegations of fraud began soon after the election, at a point when the preliminary counting 
program PREP had not yet finished its work. On July 4, all media, newspapers, radio and TV 
stations announced the breaking news that three million votes were missing – according to a 
statement López Obrador made during an interview. The success of the Coalition’s strategy 
for constructing a strong perception of fraud was made possible in part by the IFE’s deficient 
communication about certain aspects of the electoral process, and in part by a lack of profes-
sional behavior by Mexican journalists. In fact, in February 2006 all major political parties 
had signed on to an agreement with the IFE to create a so-called “archive of inconsistencies” 
where unclear ballots would be stored to be counted only in the final and valid district counts. 
They were not to be included in the first quick count (conteo rapido) and the preliminary 
counting program (PREP), which offer only a preliminary real-time election result, but are not 
valid as final results. Neither the IFE nor the parties had informed the voters about this new 
procedure, whether because of a lapse or a lack of the issue’s perceived importance. As a re-
sult, the newspaper and radio and TV stations opened with breaking news of possible fraud, 
apparently without doing much investigation of what was going on at the IFE. Consequently, 
the IFE’s clarification came as a surprise to many, as expressed in the newspaper La Jornada 
(04.07.2006)
19: “At night the IFE justified the contradictions of the numbers in a bulletin 
which announced the existence of a surprising subsystem called ‘archive of inconsistencies’ 
(…).” Thus, although nothing irregular or untoward had happened with those 3 million bal-
lots, the idea of fraud appeared in the Mexican public arena, and it fell on fertile ground, due 
to a strong legacy of electoral manipulations. 
After this initial deficit of professional coverage, the information about the conflict between 
López Obrador’s supporters and “the others”, i.e. the state, the institutions, as well as citizens 
not in favor of López Obrador was marked by a higher degree of professionalism. According 
to Hallin/Mancini (2004: 34-36) professionalism in the media possesses three dimensions: 
autonomy, distinct professional norms and public service orientation. In this regard, too, Mex-
ico corresponds to the ideal type of the Polarized Pluralist Model of the media system: “Pro-
fessionalization of journalism is not as strongly developed as in the other models: journalism 
is not as strongly differentiated from political activism and the autonomy of journalism is of-
ten limited (…).” (Hallin/Mancini 2004: 73). With the tradition of a high degree of partisan 
                                                 
18 The in-depth semi-structured interviews have been carried out in August/September 2006 in Mexico City. The 
interviewees were researchers like Raul Trejo Delarbre (UNAM) and José Woldenberg (who also served as 
President of the IFE from 1996-2003), journalists as Dolores Beistegui (Director of the Mexican Radio Insti-
tute IMER), Julio DiBella (Director of Canal 11) and other Mexican experts. 
19 See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/07/04/005n1pol.php <Rev. 03.01.2006>. 
(„Por la noche el IFE salió a justificar las contradicciones en las cifras, mediante un boletín en el que anunció la 
existencia de un sorpresivo subsistema denominado ''archivo de inconsistencias'', en el que quedan consigna-
das las actas de escrutinio y cómputo que hayan presentado inconsistencias.“)  
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bias this adds up to the assumption that political conflict would directly translate into a con-
tinued media battle. 
In effect, the media did take sides, and a left/right cleavage framed events in the post-electoral 
period. Newspapers as opinion-leaders and agenda-setters played an important role during 
that moment, since they could best distribute and reflect the numerous and multifaceted in-
formation and comments, for which the limited space and time of radio and TV provided less 
opportunity. Nevertheless, framing according to partisan affiliation or sympathy occurred in 
all media and, as expected, assumed a more polarized shape than during the campaigns. The 
term “framing” refers to highlight certain aspects of an issue, embedding information of 
events into a broader spectrum of interpretation (McQuail 2002: 392). This means that in the 
media coverage all political and social events in the period after the election were framed by, 
i.e. interpreted in the light of the post-electoral conflict. 
However, even though the perceived degree of polarization in the media increased after the 
election, the two different “camps” of Lopezobradoristas and Caderonistas did not merge into 
monolithic blocks fighting a surrogate media battle. “Obviously, there was no corporate deci-
sion of the (media) companies to present only one version of the events”, noted Mexican me-
dia expert Raul Trejo, who nonetheless expressed concerns about the media’s role in the con-
struction of fraud.
20 According to him, their propensity for drama and ignorance had sup-
ported the rise of the idea of fraud. Several journalists spoke out positively on López Obrador 
and his activities, even in media that were critical of him overall. The same applies, to a lesser 
degree, to decidedly leftist publications such as the daily La Jornada and the weekly political 
magazine Proceso. Thus Dolores Beistegui, Director of the Mexican Radio Institute IMER, 
described a “principle of autoregulation by each individual, rather than on an institutionalized 
level”. She underlined that “Televisa is not in favor of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, yet 
some of its presenters, journalists like Carmen Arristegui, are.” The same was true for news-
papers like the center-right Reforma, in which leftist comments favoring the PRD’s Coalition 
have been published alongside opinions opposing López Obrador. In the sense that journalists 
are free to publish their opinions without any party and government control, concludes 
Beistegui, has Mexico changed “100 percent”.
21 
At the same time the Coalition fervidly expressed allegations of a perceived partisan bias to 
the extent of an outright war in the media to underline their argument of a necessary revoca-
tion of the election. As Jenaro Villamil complained, “Televisa utterly loses its neutral charac-
ter and becomes part of the post-electoral conflict”. Villamil points out that with respect to the 
mass protest in Mexico City “the programs with the highest ratings on Televisa opted to make 
the mobilization of more than two million people invisible. TV Azteca, too, decided to deny 
voice and image to the hundreds of thousands proclaiming ‘voto por voto, casilla por 
casilla’.” (Villamil 2006b: 20) Despite the interesting (rhetorical) implication of Televisa’s 
neutrality during the actual campaign, there is something more to this argument. The coverage 
in newspapers was indeed more intensive and detailed than on TV. One reason for that may 
                                                 
20 Interview with Raul Trejo Delarbre, 11.08.2006. 
21 Interview with Dolores Beistegui, 22.08.2006.  
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lie in the nature of the medium: newspapers provide a lot more space for multi-faceted cover-
age of the events and different comments and opinions. Julio DiBella, General Director of 
Mexico’s largest and most important state-owned TV-Station, Canal 11, offers a different 
interpretation. He notes that reporters for the private networks Televisa and TV Azteca, whose 
credibility (especially on the left) had been tarnished by the electoral season and the “Televisa 
Law”, could actually physically not enter the tent city set up by López Obrador’s supporters 
without being insulted, beaten or have their equipment destroyed – supposedly, some report-
ers were even kidnapped. This did not happen to Canal 11 reporters, which he interprets as a 
sign of the citizen recognition of the station as a more trustworthy and balanced source of 
political information, as shown by the protesters’ attitude to Canal 11 TV crews.
22 
As a quasi-monopoly that has become the most visible icon of corporate media in Mexico, 
Televisa has suffered a great loss of trust and a considerable damage to its image. Protest 
manifestations directed against Televisa and its perceived negative coverage of the Coalition’s 
candidate López Obrador have been an integral part of the mass demonstrations. One poster 
that could be seen during the events read “Do you believe Televisa? – Neither do I!” More-
over, the network has suffered losses in its ratings as well. Even though financially, 2006 has 
been a very successful year for Televisa’s business, due to revenue from the elections and the 
World Championship of Soccer, the symptoms of a crisis at Televisa are now apparent. For 
the first time in its history, the ratings of its main news program declined below those of TV 
Azteca. Other programs offering political information, like Zona Abierta and Tercer Grado, 
also lost some of their audience. (Villamil 2006b: 21) 
Overall, these observations suggest that the media coverage of the post-electoral period has 
indeed been less balanced and more polarized, reflecting the political fault lines dividing 
Mexican society. This indeed reflects both the strong partisan bias inherent in the Mexican 
media system, and the existing moderating effect of the mechanisms of fair media coverage in 
place during campaigns. At least among citizens actively involved in the protests, skepticism 
against commercial media, which they perceived as highly opposed to “their candidate”, was 
prevalent and has been routinely expressed. However, a great deal of detailed and extensive 
information on the events and political configurations of the post-electoral period has been 
available to the Mexican citizens, from a variety of sources. The different interpretations of 
what was happening and what it meant were freely expressed, published and accessible, often 
within the very same medium. While partisan bias is a traditional feature of Mexican journal-
ism, the large variety and openness to other opinions reflects a more recent achievement of 
Mexican democratization, especially since the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Interview with Julio DiBella, 23.08.2006.  
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6.  A Danger for Mexico’s Democracy? 
 
Even though an independent analysis does not support allegations of fraud in 2006, the ques-
tion remains whether the events and the rhetoric around this election have been harmful to 
Mexico’s young democracy. The public discourse during and after the post-electoral period, 
especially when López Obrador “inaugurated” himself as “legitimate President” of Mexico, 
led to widespread worries about the future development of democratic consolidation. Over the 
weeks after the election, López Obrador and his supporters expressed distrust and scorn not 
only vis-a-vis electoral institutions, but democratic institutions in general. According to López 
Obrador, the institutions were “in crisis, in ruins, absolutely useless”, he had “no respect at all 
for their institutions, because they are not the people’s institutions.” (Ramos 2006). For ob-
servers on the right, López Obrador himself became the “tropical messiah” (Krauze 2006), or 
“Subcomandante Andrés”, in reference to neo-Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos (Sodi 
de la Tijera 2006). López Obrador’s populist ideal of a more direct democracy, in which “the 
street” dominates institutions, alienated many citizens (including members of his own party) 
and further distanced him from a constructive dialogue with the other political representatives 
from the conservative and market-oriented PAN side. 
The final issue to be taken up in this paper is whether the allegations of electoral fraud and the 
scorn displayed by López Obrador and his supporters for the electoral regime have caused 
additional defects to Mexico’s “illiberal” defective democracy (Thiery 2006).
23 Due to the 
absence of any “real” incidents known as harmful to democracy, as a severe political or eco-
nomic crisis, the success of an anti-system party or the failure of the electoral regime and its 
institutions, this leads to the question of how and to what extent political rhetoric followed by 
mass protest may lead to democratic defects. The concept of “Embedded Democracy” (Puhle 
2007, Merkel et al. 2003) provides meaningful criteria for measuring democratic consolida-
tion, or, in its absence, the particular defects of democracy, because it stretches beyond Robert 
Dahl’s minimalist criteria of Polyarchy, but is still not excessively demanding. An embedded 
democracy encompasses five (both independent and interdependent) partial regimes and their 
criteria. 
Civil rights, rule of law and minority rights (9-11) have neither been touched upon nor been 
put in doubt by the electoral or post-electoral process of 2006, yet they remain generally defi-
cient in Mexico. The access to and the functioning of independent courts are central to elec-
toral conflict resolution in closely fought and contested elections, testing the institutionaliza-
tion of democracies (see Whitehead 2006). The Mexican system of electoral conflict resolu-
tion, in which final decisions fall to the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE)
24, has functioned 
according to legal provisions in 2006. In a tense political situation the Court followed legal 
rules, reviewed the claims of the parties thoroughly, and came to a reasonable sentence within 
                                                 
23 For an in-depth analysis of Mexico’s democratic defects see Thiery 2006, and consult the Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index’ Country Report (http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/109.0.html?L=1 <Rev. 
09.01.2007>). 
24 Or as it is more formally called, the Electoral Court of the Judicial Power of the Federation (TEPJF). See 
Orozco Henríquez 2006 for details about the Mexican system of electoral conflict resolution.  
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the period foreseen by electoral law. Unfortunately, not all courts work that well in Mexico. 
Since the conflictual post-electoral situation has had no discernible effects on the mechanisms 
of horizontal accountability (D), I will leave this partial regime out of the focus.  
 
Embedded Democracy: Partial Regimes (A-E) and Criteria (1-11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Puhle 2007: 131, Merkel et al. 2003: 57  
 
This leaves us with the criteria of the remaining three partial regimes: electoral regime (A), 
political liberties/public arena (B) and the effective power to govern (C). As the first part of 
the paper has shown, some actors’ allegations of fraud (understood as deliberate and aggre-
gate manipulations of election results in favor of one candidate) are not supported by empiri-
cal data. The elections were indeed extremely close, but López Obrador lost because he 
lacked the votes. Despite some minor incidents, all of which were addressed by election 
monitoring institutions, the 2006 elections in Mexico were free and fair. Basic political rights 
were respected, which unfortunately is not the general rule in Mexico and a major reason for 
democratic deficits. In the post-electoral period, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and 
freedom of association were all put into practice. Several thousand protesters gathered peace-
fully, showed their rejection of the election results and blocked the center of Mexico City for 
more than two months without any interference from state institutions. Despite strong de-
mands from some sectors of the public to end the protests, these demonstrations were permit-
ted by the government. This might be considered especially striking, since in Mexico assaults 
against civil and human rights are repeatedly reported by international NGOs such as Am-
nesty International. Reporters Without Borders lists Mexico as one of the most dangerous 
countries for journalists.  
The analysis suggests, that the two aspects which may have been the most negatively influ-
enced by the construction of fraud and anti-institutional expressions of mass protest, is the 
0. Stateness 
A. Electoral Regime 
1.  elected officials 
2.  inclusive suffrage 
3.  right to run for office/full contestation 
4.  free and fair elections 
B. Political Liberties/ Public Arena 
5.  freedom of speech, of the press and of information 
6.  freedom of association 
C. Effective Power to Govern 
7.  government by elective officials/ no reserved domains 
D. Horizontal Accountability 
8.  checks and balances 
E. Rechtsstaat 
9.  civil rights 
10.  rule of law and judicial review/independent courts/ 
equal access to and equality in court 
11. rights/protection of minorities  
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partial regime of the effective power to govern and the levels of support for democracy. Do 
elected representatives have the power to govern when they face such a strong opposition in 
and outside the parliament, and when a President leads the executive branch with a strongly 
contested legitimacy? When representatives of the opposition express their distrust in the na-
tion’s institutions with protests in parliament itself, one should ask whether the support for 
democracy and trust in democratic institutions has suffered among Mexican citizens. 
 
6.1. Democratic Support 
The operationalization of “democratic support” has received further nuance since David 
Easton’s distinction between interest-oriented specific support and value-oriented diffuse sup-
port (Easton 1965, 1975). In Easton’s concept as well as in earlier works, as in Al-
mond/Verba’s (1963) famous study on Civic Culture, political attitudes are deeply rooted in 
citizens’ socialization. We also find approaches focusing on the performance of political sys-
tems (outputs) and how citizens perceive their responsiveness. Such studies are based on the 
idea that citizens’ attitudes and their behavior towards a political system stem from their as-
sessment of the political outputs and the responsiveness of the political system to their needs: 
“Thus, the perceived efficacy of a regime is among those attitudes which are fundamentally 
related to democratic legitimacy and the perception of its political institutions as the most 
appropriate means of government. [...] In this vein, opinions about the legitimacy of a regime 
are linked to judgments of the merits of incumbent authorities, perceptions of governmental 
performance, and/or the gap between respondent’s ideals and political reality.” (Mor-
lino/Montero 1995: 234)  
Gunther/Montero/Torcal (2007) distinguish between democratic support, discontent and disaf-
fection. Disaffection describes the „subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism and lack of 
confidence in the political process, politicians and democratic institutions“ (Gun-
ther/Montero/Torcal 2007: 33). The roots of disaffection reach deep into the socialization of 
citizens and are hardly affected by short-term influences or temporary dissatisfaction. Discon-
tent, on the other hand, refers to the dissatisfaction with the particular functioning of democ-
racy in a given country at a given time – when citizens are not satisfied with the policies or 
the behavior of their incumbents. Discontent stems from the discrepancy between positive 
expectations and negative evaluations of political efficacy and usually results in voting-out 
the incumbents or governing parties. If discontent continues over a longer period and the de-
mocratic actors and institutions do not deliver or adjust their responsiveness to the citizens’ 
needs, discontent might feed a shift to more disaffection. A significantly higher degree of dis-
content after the elections than Mexicans had expressed before could hint at an erosion of 
democratic support, but as a singular event it is not very likely (according to this concept) to 
be a danger for the Mexican democracy at large. Additionally, I will test whether the anti-
institutional rhetoric by López Obrador has translated into widespread distrust in democratic 
institutions. Do citizens still have faith in Mexico’s electoral institutions?  
The data monitoring long-term developments of trust in institutions and democratic support  
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are taken from the Latinobarometro
25 and the annual Encuesta Nacional Sobre Cultura 
Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas (ENCUP 2005)
26 (the latter is carried out by the Mexican 
government). However, the data in these sources are published only once a year, so the use of 
additional sources that might reveal short-term shifts is also necessary. With all the usual ca-
veats about the limited reliability of surveys with smaller N and data gained from telephone 
interviews, data gathered by Grupo Reforma and El Universal can help us to begin to answer 
these questions. Their surveys used samples in the range of 450-600 respondents and were 
collected by a professional staff experienced with empirical methods.
27 
Support for López Obrador and sympathy for his protest declined dramatically in the weeks 
after the election. Thus, by the end of July, 59 percent considered his behavior to be “irre-
sponsible”, and by the end of August, he would have gained only 30 percent of respondents’ 
votes (Felipe Calderón 54 percent).
28 López Obrador nonetheless succeeded in anchoring the 
idea that at least some kind of fraud had occurred in the 2006 presidential election. More than 
one third of the respondents agreed in mid- and late July that the result was “not trustworthy”, 
41 percent believed in “severe irregularities” (Reforma, 30.07.2006, p.4), and 59 percent ex-
pressed belief in electoral fraud (El Universal, 14.08.2006, p. A17). Although a significant 
part of the citizens did not support López Obrador’s radical means of protest, such as pro-
claiming himself “legitimate president”, blocking President Fox from giving his annual In-
forme del Gobierno in Congress and causing a traffic nightmare that snarled Mexico City’s 
vehicles for several weeks, there was a widespread belief in some kind of electoral manipula-
tions. When it is seen in a broader Latin American perspective, Mexicans’ skepticism regard-
ing clean elections was, according to the Latinobarometro data, close to the regional aver-
age.
29 The belief in clean elections in Mexico even increased, from 22 percent in 2005 to 40 
percent in 2006,
30 which follows the regional trend, according to which more Latin Americans 
see their elections as clean.
31 
At the same time, trust in institutions remains rather low. About one third of citizens have 
little or no trust in the institutions of the electoral regime, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) 
and the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE). 
 
But as the data in table 6 show, no significant withdrawal of trust from the institutions in-
volved in and responsible for the electoral process has occurred. The open scorn for these 
institutions displayed by López Obrador and his supporters is not representative of the citi-
                                                 
25 http://www.latinobarometro.org <Rev. 09.01.2007>. 
26 http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/encup/ <Rev. 09.01.2007> N= 4700, face-to-face interviews. 
27 El Universal is a centrist daily newspaper, Reforma instead is more center-right. The leftist La Jornada news-
paper did not present figures that would be comparable in respect to number and quality of the data. 
28 Reforma, 30.07.2006, p.1/ Reforma, 27.08.2006, p. 4/ also El Universal 04.09.2006, p. A11. 
29 In Mexico, according to these data, 40 percent believe that clean elections have been held in 2006, the Latin 
American average is 41 percent. (Latinobarometro 2006: 18).. 
The Latinobarometro’s data in 2006 has been collected in 20.234 interviews in Latin America between October 3 
and November 5, 2006. Thus, it does reflect opinions after the election and the post-electoral period. 
30 Latinobarometro 2006: 19. 
31 From 54 (fraudulent): 37 (clean) in 2005 to 49 (fraudulent): 41 (clean) in 2006 in Latin America; Latino-
barometro 2006: 17.  
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zenry at large, and it seems that the obituaries for the IFE (Flores 2006) were premature, par-
tisan, and arbitrary. Data on satisfaction with the functioning of the political system confirm 
this picture. 
The mid-term parliamentary elections in 1997 and the general elections in 2000 and 2006 
seem to have had an invigorating influence on the perceptions of the performance of democ-
racy. This underlines the importance of the electoral regime’s transformation and the experi-
ence of elections that have been the most competitive and least manipulated in Mexican his-
tory. The data for 2006 were collected between October 3 and November 5, so the 41 percent 
of citizens reporting satisfaction with the functioning of their democracy in that year already 
take the election and the subsequent events into account.  
 
Table 6: Trust in IFE and TRIFE in percent, Jan-Aug 2006 
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Source: Reforma, 27.08.2006, p. 4 
 
Even though the post-electoral conflict has not diminished the satisfaction with the function-
ing of democracy, the level of discontent is still high. Paradoxically, the belief in democracy 
itself as a desirable political system decreased in 2006, at the same time as satisfaction with 
this system has grown. Sixty-eight percent of respondents (seven percent less that in 2005) 
agreed that democracy, despite its problems, is the best political system. In this regard Mexico 
has fallen below the Latin American average of 74 percent (which has risen by four percent 
since 2005).
32 This is also reflected in the decline of electoral participation: only 58,6 percent 
voted in 2006, compared to 64 percent in 2000. Among the eleven Latin American countries 
that held presidential elections in 2005/2006, only Honduras had a lower turnout (55 per-
cent).
33 At the same time Mexicans are optimistic about the future of their democracy: 47 per-
                                                 
32 Latinobarometro 2006: 65. 
33 Latinobarometro 2006: 13.  
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cent think that their democracy will be better, or at least partially better in the future, while 
only 22 percent belief it will be worse.
34  
 
Table 7: Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy 1995 – 2006, in percent 
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Source: Latinobarometro, Press Release 2006: 74  
Here: Percentage of respondents stating that they were very satisfied and those stating that they were more than 
less satisfied. 
“In general: Would you say that you are very satisfied, more than less satisfied (más bien satisfecho), not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the functioning of democracy in Mexico?”  
 
A close analysis of the available data thus do not support the impression that there has been a 
loss of support for democracy in Mexico, or increased distrust in the electoral regime’s insti-
tutions that could be related to the post-electoral claims of fraud. Whether the broader de-
crease in the general approval of democracy as a desirable political system is just a deviation 
or a deeper trend will require further analysis. 
 
6.2. Effective Power to Govern 
In addition to the level of support for democracy prevailing in Mexican society, it is important 
for the consolidation of democracy that the elected representatives have the effective power to 
govern.
35 The proclamation of an alternative government presided by López Obrador, who 
had himself elected in “alternative” elections on Mexico City’s Zocalo on September 16, 
2006, and the effective blockade of political institutions by his supporters had put the new 
government under pressure. Beyond the non-parliamentary opposition manifested by hun-
dreds of thousands of protesters on the streets, the Coalition had been very successful in the 
                                                 
34 ENCUP 2006: 21. 
35 On the role of effective power to govern in embedded democracies, and the possible defects caused by lack 
thereof, see Merkel et al. (2003).  
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parliamentary election and could therefore carry the protest into formal institutions of the 
state. 
 
Table 8: Allocation of Seats in both Parliamentary Chambers 2000-2010
36 
  Chamber of Deputies 
(500 seats) 
Senate 
(128 seats) 
 2003-2006 
(LIX Legislatura) 
2006-2009 
(LX Legislatura) 
2000-2006  2006-2010 
PRI  201  104 (- 48.3%)  58  33 (- 43.1%) 
PAN  148  206 (+ 39.2%)  47  52 (+ 10.6%) 
PRD  97  124 (+ 27.8%)  15  29 (+ 93.3%) 
Convergencia  5 18  -  5 
PT  6 16  -  2 
PVEM  17 19  5  6 
Nueva Alianza  - 9  -  1 
Alternativa  - 4  -  - 
Independent  26 -  3  - 
Source: Reforma, 23.08.2006, S. 7, author’s calculations 
 
The 2006 elections were very successful for the PRD: Besides a 30 percent increase in seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies, the party almost doubled its presence in the Senate and again 
won the government of the Distrito Federal (Mexico City). Next to the PAN, which also in-
creased its share of power, the PRD is now the second most influential party in Mexico.  
During the post-electoral period and after, López Obrador’s protest and denunciation of insti-
tutions were introduced into parliament by congressmen associated with the Coalition. When 
President Vicente Fox tried to give his annual Informe del Gobierno, these representatives 
seized the tribune and blocked the building’s entries. Fox was finally forced to deliver his 
speech from the presidential residence Los Pinos. Three days before Felipe Calderón’s inau-
guration on December 1, representatives of the Coalition and the PAN on the other side 
staged a bizarre sleep-over blockade of the Congress tribune to hinder/ensure the ceremony. 
Despite being parliamentary representatives, they supported a self-proclaimed President, who 
had closely yet definitely lost the elections. All this has aroused doubts about the new gov-
ernment’s ability to govern. However, with majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate, effective government is perfectly possible for the PAN – meaning that elected 
representatives execute real power to decide on and implement policies. With the support of 
                                                 
36 Although PRD, PT and Covergencia ran in the elections as Coalición por el Bien de Todos on the one side, as 
well as PRI and the green party PVEM as Alianza por México on the other side, they are not coalition part-
ners in parliament. As the senior partners in their electoral coalitions, both PRD and PRI had signed contracts 
with the smaller parties, fixing a percentage that the small parties would gain from the joint electoral result. 
The PRD passed 6% of their seats on to PT, 5,5% to Convergencia. The PVEM obtained 6,6% from the 
Alianza’s seats. As we can see, the small parties benefit considerably from this agreement (which is not so 
obvious in the case of the PVEM, because it had already joined an alliance with PAN in 2000 and had al-
ready benefited from this coalition in that year).  
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the PRI, Nueva Alianza and/or the green PVEM, all of whom fully accept the legitimacy of 
Felipe Calderón as president, the PAN could (at least theoretically) obtain absolute and two-
thirds majorities, which would be necessary for constitutional reforms. 
Only a few months after the elections, the support for López Obrador began to diminish. Even 
though more than half of Mexicans evidently believe in some kind of fraudulent activities in 
the elections, large parts of the population do not agree with López Obrador’s means of pro-
test. In October/November 2006, 60 percent approved of their government, and 50 percent 
expressed confidence in the president – both numbers are above the Latin American average 
(54 percent and 47 percent respectively).
37 López Obrador remains an important non-
parliamentary opposition leader with tight connections to parliamentary incumbents, but he is 
not powerful enough to hold the government in check. His movement cannot be considered to 
be a tutelary power, in the sense of “democratically non-legitimized elites and power groups, 
which elude government authority and thus safeguard extra-constitutional privileges no longer 
controlled by the state.”
38 The strong opposition the government is facing inside and outside 
parliament may moderate its policies, yet the government disposes of all the necessary re-
sources and effective power to govern. Whether the Calderón government will employ this 
power or submit to potential veto actors, such as influential economic enterprises or drug car-
tels, is another story. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
There is a long way left to go on Mexico’s road towards a consolidated democracy, most of 
all in the realm of the rule of law. The electoral regime, whose reforms constituted the core of 
the country’s transformation, is basically functioning well, despite “irregularities” noted by 
domestic and international election observers. These irregularities, which include vote buying 
and inappropriate conditions in the polling stations, are rooted in long traditions of corruption, 
the prevalence of informal over formal rules and the dominance of local caciques (bosses). 
However, election observers do not support the notion of a deliberate manipulation of the 
election in favor of the PAN’s candidate Felipe Calderón. Besides claiming fraudulent activi-
ties in the electoral process, the defeated Coalición Por el Bien de Todos and most promi-
nently its candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador has also complained about a “campaign of 
hate” by which his competitor and the media allegedly conspired to diminish his chances to 
win.  
This paper has analyzed the media’s performance during the 2006 presidential campaign, re-
garding both the mode of allocating publicity and the mode of coverage of the campaign. In 
both cases the data do not support either the thesis of an increased negativism in general, nor 
one directed against one of the competing parties. In fact, the media’s allocation of publicity 
                                                 
37 Latinobarometro 2006: 76. 
38 Merkel et al. (2003): 92 „Dies sind demokratisch nicht legitimierte Eliten und Machtgruppen, die sich der 
Regierungsautorität entziehen und dadurch extrakonstitutionelle und nicht mehr kontrollierbare Vorrechte si-
chern.“  
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complied with the legal rules - despite minor exceptions, which actually sometimes suggest 
favoritism towards López Obrador, as in the case of TV Azteca’s heavily discounting the air-
time for his daily TV show. The mode of coverage featured a moderate degree of partisan 
bias, which is deeply rooted in Mexican journalism and the media system. However, the num-
ber of negative references decreased during the second half of the campaign, as the positive 
references converged for the three most important parties. The fair media mechanisms imple-
mented in the 1994 electoral reform continued to show a significant effect of moderation, as 
they had in the previous elections. That the degree of partisan bias in the media coverage was 
actually affected by these mechanisms is strongly suggested by the increased bias that pre-
vailed in coverage during the post-electoral period. Even without data comparable to the Fed-
eral Electoral Institute’s Media Monitor, a common perception of a stronger party parallelism 
during the highly conflictual weeks after the Election Day could be observed. 
Although the perception of some fraudulent manipulation has been successfully disseminated 
by López Obrador and his followers in a broad swathe of Mexican society – rendered believ-
able by a long historical experience of electoral fraud – Mexicans do not seem to be too im-
pressed by the Coalition’s persistent rhetoric when it comes to support for the electoral re-
gime’s institutions. The level of trust in the Federal Electoral Institute and the Electoral Tri-
bunal has not diminished overall. Also, Mexicans were significantly more satisfied with the 
functioning of their democracy in 2006 than in the eight previous years. Its new president may 
have been elected with the small margin of only 0.56 percentage points of the votes, yet the 
government has the effective power to govern: it is accepted by all other parties except the 
parties that made up López Obradors Coalition. Felipe Calderón’s PAN will be able to form 
coalitions and obtain parliamentary majorities, even if it may lack the ability to put forward a 
bold legislative program under these conditions. 
There are a few worrisome trends in this picture: voter participation has dropped steadily 
since 1994, and the belief in democracy as the best available political system in the Churchil-
lean sense is weakening. Now that the new government has finally been installed, its first pri-
ority should not only be to consolidate its legitimacy to govern, but to restore and stimulate 
the citizens’ faith in democracy, and the faith that the road to democracy is worth its troubles. 
 
[Postscript: After the completion of the manuscript, in September 2007, under intense protests 
by the private media outlets, Mexican legislators passed an electoral reform, which in a way 
was a reaction to the controversies over the electoral and postelectoral process of 2006. This 
reform has, among other points, reduced the duration of presidential campaigns to 90 days 
and banned the acquisition of airtime in radio and TV by the parties. Spots shall only be 
broadcast by public media outlets and within the limited airtime reserved for public announ-
cements in the private media (free of charge). The intention was to reduce campaign costs.]  
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